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CoNsTITUTIONAL LAw-EQuAL PRoTEcnoN-D.ANCAGE AcnoN FOR BREACH

CoVEN.ANT-Plaintiffs sued at law to recover damages
for breach of a racial restrictive covenant, 1 alleging that defendants violated
the covenant by conveying restricted property to persons of the Negro race and
placing them in possession and occupancy. The circuit court granted defendants' motion to dismiss. On appeal, held, affirmed. The Fourteenth Amendment
prevents the maintenance of an action for breach of racial restrictive covenants.2
Phillips 11. Naff, (Mich. 1952) 52 N.W. (2d) 158.
In a somewhat similar case, plaintiff covenantees brought an action to enforce a racial restrictive covenant and for damages sustained as a result of a
conspiracy to injure the value of plaintiff's property. The defendants had
conveyed restricted property to a co-defendant, who was "without financial
responsibility" and who in tum had conveyed to members of the excluded
Negro race.3 The district court sustained general demurrers to the petition in
its entirety and dismissed the action. On appeal, held, reversed and remanded
insofar as the claim for damages was dismissed. The Fourteenth Amendment
does not shield a conspiracy to cause damage by violation of a racial restrictive
covenant. Correll 11. Earley, (Okla. 1951) 237 P. (2d) 1017.
OF RACIAL R:esTRICTIVE

1 "The use and occupancy of all lands subject hereto is hereby restricted to white persons of pure Caucasian race.•••" Quoted in the opinion, 52 N.W. (2d) 158 at 159.
2 The court also put its decision on the ground that the interpretation of the covenant
contended for by plaintiff would impose a burden on the power of alienation, invalid in
Michigan under the holding in Porter v. Barrett, 233 Mich. 373, 206 N.W. 532 (1925).
3 The principal defendants in the case were sued on the theory of conspiracy to injure
plaintiffs' property, rather than for breach of contract. They did not in fact violate the
covenant by selling to the impecunious white middleman.
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In 1948 the United States Supreme Court settled a much agitated constitutional issue by holding in the Restrictive C011enant Cases4 that judicial enforcement of racial restrictive covenants by state courts through equitable remedies of specific performance (restraining injunction, divestiture of title, etc.)
amounts to "state action" which violates the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court's opinion emphasized that the covenants
themselves (being created by private persons) are not invalid,5 and that the
amendment is not violated as long as the purposes of the covenants are effectuated by "voluntary adherence" 6 to their terms. Judicial enforcement is the
forbidden evil.7 It was apparent that the next question would be whether the
holding in the Restrictive C011enant Cases was confined to equitable decrees
operating directly upon members of the excluded class or encompassed as well
state court judgments for damages for breach of the covenants.8 In 1949 the
Supreme Court of Missouri, in Weiss 11. Leaon,9 held that a judgment for damages is not precluded by the Fourteenth Amendment. The theory of the court
in that decision, as in Correll 11. Earley,10 rests on the narrow interpretation
of the Restrictive Covenant Cases, i.e., that the holding prohibits only decrees
for specific performance of such covenants. The Michigan court in Phillips 11.
Naff (expressly rejecting the principle of Weiss 11. Leaon) adopts a broad construction in concluding that an action for damages is in reality an indirect
method of enforcement of the covenant,11 and hence falls within the bar. This
opinion reasons that if the sale of property subject to a racial covenant cannot
be made without making the grantor liable in damages, this "would operate
to inhibit freedom of purchase by those against whom the discrimination is
4 Shelley v. Kraemer, McGhee v. Sipes, 334 U. S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 836 (1948), and the
companion cases arising in the District of Columbia, Hurd v. Hodge, Urciolo v. Hodge,
334 U.S. 24, 68 S.Ct. 847 (1948).
5 Otherwise, among other consequences, Congress could presumably make the formation
of such covenants criminal, under the power delegated by the Fourteenth Amendment to
enforce its provisions by appropriate legislation.
6 334 U.S. 1 at 13.
7 "The difference between judicial enforcement and nonenforcement of the restrictive
covenants is the difference to petitioners between being denied rights of property available
to other members of the community and being accorded full enjoyment of those rights on
an equal footing." 334 U.S. 1 at 19.
s Before the Restrictive Covenant Cases it had been assumed by the state courts that
a damage action is open to the covenantee, if it is desired. In Wyatt v. Adair, 215 Ala.
363, 110 S. 801 (1926), the court went so far as to sanction a tenant's action for breach
of an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment when a landlord rented an apartment to Negroes
in a building in which the other apartment was occupied by whites. And see Eason v.
Buffaloe, 198 N.C. 520, 152 S.E. 496 (1930), and Chandler v. Ziegler. 88 Colo. 1, 291
P. 822 (1930). The reason for the paucity of appellate decisions allowing a damage
action is probably that such remedy is vastly inferior to equitable relief in this type of
case, and was seldom sought prior to the Restrictive Covenant Cases.
9 359 Mo. 1054, 225 S.W. (2d) 127 (1949).
10 Although the suit in Correll v. Earley was brought in tort for conspiracy to injure
the value of plaintiffs' property, the gist of the action was the breach of the covenant.
1152 N.W. (2d) 158 at 162.
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directed,"12 and that the invocation of court aid to permit recovery of such
damages is the invocation of state action. 13 The Michigan holding seems to be
more consistent with the philosophy of the Court in the Restrictive Covenant
Cases. Even though the rights of the particular Negro are secure in any given
action for damages, the indirect effect of a judgment for plaintiff is to "deny
rights of property"14 by causing members of the excluded race to pay a much
higher price for restricted land, a price representing the market value plus the
anticipated potential liability to which the seller-covenantoi: is subjected.15 Moreover, compliance with the covenant by a willing seller, because of the fear of
a court judgment, hardly seems to be "voluntary adherence" to the terms of the
covenant. This is true even though the making of the contract remains a private
affair safe from the prohibition of the Constitution. In view of the direct conflict in the state courts on this issue,16 it is probable that the question will
eventually be raised in the United States Supreme Court; if so, logical extension of the holding in the Restrictive Covenant Cases would seem to demand
that no distinction be drawn between equitable and legal enforcement of racial
restrictive covenants in applying the Fourteenth Amendment.
Richard W. Pogue, S.Ed.

12 Id.

at 164.
"Plaintiffs' action for damages may not be regarded as involving individual conduct
solely •.. plaintiffs assert the right to invoke State action within the meaning of the terms
as discussed in Shelley v. Kraemer, supra." 52 N.W. (2d) 158 at 161, 162.
14 See note 7 supra and note the language of the court in Barrows v. Jackson, infra
note 16, at p. 112: "The coercive device of retribution in the form of damages is as effective as the coercive effect of injunctive relief, although not as immediate."
15 That such price could well be prohibitive is illustrated by the fact that in Correll v.
Early, discussed above, the plaintiffs alleged that their property had suffered a loss in value
of $10,000. There is the further point that theoretically every covenantee in the agreement
might have an action.
16 See also Roberts v. Curtis, (D.C. D.C. 1950) 93 F. Supp. 604, and a recent California decision, Barrows v. Jackson, 247 P. (2d) 99 (1952), in which the court aligned
itself with the Michigan position and regarded the contrary view of the Missouri and
Oklahoma courts as based on a misreading of the Restrictive Covenant Cases.
13

